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ABSTRACT 
University psychology and sociology researchers rated the likelihood they would engage in 
misconduct as described in nine research scenarios, while also making moral judgments and 
rating the likelihood of discovery and sanctions.  Multiple regression revealed significant effects 
across various scenarios for moral judgment as well as shame and embarrassment on reducing 
misconduct.  The effects on misconduct of the perceived probability of sanctions were 
conditioned on moral judgments in some scenarios.  The results have implications for how 
universities address the prevention, detection, and sanctioning of research misconduct. 
Keywords:  research misconduct, rational choice, moral decision-making, academic ethics 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 Research misconduct is defined in federal regulations as Fabrication, Falsification, or 
Plagiarism (FFP) in proposing, performing, or reviewing research or in reporting research 
results. This definition of research misconduct does not, however, exhaust the realm of unethical 
research behavior; less serious offenses are sometimes referred to as Questionable Research 
Practices (QRPs).  QRPs are actions that violate traditional values of the research enterprise and 
that may be detrimental to the research process, including everything from rounding down p 
values (John, Lowenstein, & Prelec, 2012) to misrepresenting speculations as fact (U.S. National 
Academies of Science, 1992, p.6).  
 A meta-analysis of the prevalence studies published to date found that between .3% and 
4.9% of scientists have reportedly fabricated or falsified research data (Fanelli, 2009).  An 
average of 33.7% of respondents in these studies also admitted to engaging in other Questionable 
Research Practices.  However, 84% of the 2,599 funded researchers in another study reported 
observing at least one case of what they considered scientific error or other misbehavior of one 
kind or another (Koocher, Keith-Spiegel, Tabachnick, Sieber, & Butler, 2010). John, et.al. 
(2012), found that the mean admission rate among psychologists across ten QRPs was 36%, with 
94% of respondents admitting to having engaged in at least one of the listed behaviors.  
 The purpose of this study was to investigate how and why misconduct occurs.  With a 
focus on two social science fields, this exploratory investigation examined the possible 
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application of rational choice theory to research misconduct by faculty researchers, grounded in a 
model of moral decision-making.  The goal was to explore the pathways that may lead to a 
decision to engage in research misconduct of various kinds, both serious and less serious, 
including those actions seen as very morally wrong as well as those with perhaps more 
ambiguous moral dimensions.  
Theoretical Foundation 
One framework for this investigation was the four-component model of moral decision-making 
that was developed by James Rest and colleagues as an outgrowth of the theoretical work of 
Lawrence Kohlberg on moral development (Rest, 1984).  This model has been extensively 
studied (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006) and provides a solid foundation for exploring how 
ethical and unethical decisions are made.  The four components are:  (a) moral awareness or 
sensitivity, which involves the individual assessing and interpreting a given situation, whether a 
moral issue is present and how various actions might affect others and themselves; (b) moral 
judgment or reasoning, the component most studied by researchers, described as the individual 
identifying what the moral course of action is in the situation and thus what one ought to do; (c) 
moral motivation or intent, which is developing an intention to take the moral action by 
prioritizing the moral values involved over other personal values the individual has identified to 
be at play in the situation; and (d) moral character or action, involving the actual execution of the 
action selected. 
Rational choice theory (RCT) also has empirical support in explaining various types of 
misbehavior, including academic cheating (Cochran, Chamlin, Wood, & Sellers, 1999; King & 
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Mayhew, 2002; Michaels & Miethe, 1989; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Tibbetts, 1997; Tibbetts 
& Gibson, 2002; Tibbetts & Myers, 1999) and corporate crime (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; 
Simpson, Paternoster, & Piquero, 1998).  Grounded in the philosophy of utilitarianism, rational 
choice or rational action perspectives on behavior have their roots in economics (Tittle, 
Antonaccio, Botchkovar, & Kranidioti, 2010), and serve as a framework for explaining decision-
making in terms of the more or less rational assessment of threats/costs/risks versus 
benefits/pleasures of a given action.  
Several key features or elements seem to be central to most concepts of rational choice, which 
are: (a) maximation according to individual variation - an individual will make the choice that 
has the most expected value, considering the options; (b) consequentialism – a rational choice 
assessment will include the possible consequences of the various choices; (c) individual-act 
orientation – the individual will only consider those consequences that are caused by the specific 
action s/he is considering, not those that might come about for other reasons; and (d) unlimited 
intelligence – rational people have a theoretically unlimited capacity to use reason and process 
information (Lahno, 2007). 
Several studies have examined aspects of morality in concert with rational choice.  For example, 
Paternoster and Simpson (1996) found that rational choice factors were only important in the 
intent to commit corporate crime when individuals were not restrained by moral considerations.  
Other studies provide support for this idea as well (Kroneberg, Heintze, & Mehlkop, 2010; 
Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Sierra & Hyman, 2008; Tittle, et al., 2010). 
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Among the individual costs that have been studied in relation to rational choice in the area of 
academic cheating is the concept of shame.  Although “shame proneness” as a stable trait has 
been shown to lead to increased deviance (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Tibbetts, 1997), 
anticipated shame as an emotion has been associated with decreased cheating intentions and 
criminal behavior (Cochran, et al., 1999; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Rebellon, Piquero, Piquero, 
& Tibbetts, 2010; Tibbetts, 1997).  Anticipated shame, or actual feelings of shame or 
embarrassment, may in fact mediate between the expectation of sanctions and criminal behavior 
(Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Rebellon, et al., 2010; Tibbetts & Myers, 1999).  More broadly, 
Rebellon, et al., (2010) proposed that anticipated shame may serve as a common mechanism 
among various criminological theories, including self-control theory, strain theory, and 
differential association theory. 
Research Questions 
This study examined the following research questions:  (1) To what extent do rational choice 
factors predict the intention to commit research misconduct?  (2) To what extent does the 
awareness of and judgment regarding a moral component predict the intention to commit 
research misconduct? (3) Are moral judgments associated with rational choice assessments?  In 
particular, it tested the hypothesis that a cost-benefit analysis is less likely to predict misconduct 
in situations when individuals judge the potential action as morally wrong, as compared to those 
actions that are ambiguous or not considered morally wrong.  
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METHOD 
Sample 
  The study participants were full-time tenured and tenure track faculty from psychology 
and sociology departments at U.S. research universities.  The method used to identify members 
of the study population was to randomly order a list of RU-VH (Research Universities-Very 
High research activity) doctoral degree-granting research universities in the United States 
(n=96), as compiled by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 2011.  A 
pilot sample of 130 faculty was drawn from the bottom three universities on the randomly 
ordered list, using all full-time faculty members from the two departments in the three 
institutions.  For the full survey phase, all full-time members of each department were drawn 
from the institutions at the top of the list until the sample reached at least 2,000, yielding a total 
of 2,119 individuals from 40 universities.  The faculty list from each institution was itself then 
randomly ordered, and 1,100 names were assigned to initially receive surveys through the mail, 
the remainder to be invited to participate through the online Survey Monkey software program.  
After removing names with invalid address information, the final sample sizes in the full study 
phase were 1,069 postal mail invitations and 1,001 invitations by email only. 
Procedures 
All participants were invited by postal mail or by Survey Monkey email to complete an 
anonymous self-administered survey instrument about decision-making in research.  All study 
components were reviewed and determined to be Exempt by the Institutional Review Board.   
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The Mixed sample received invitations through postal mail and then non-respondents also 
received follow-up emails from Survey Monkey; thus surveys from this group came in via both 
avenues.  The Online sample participants were contacted and invited to participate only by email 
from Survey Monkey.  The procedures for the postal mailings included a cash incentive (a $ 2 
bill), pre-notification by postcard, stamped return envelope and separate stamped completion 
postcard, multiple reminder follow-ups, and university sponsorship, all methods shown to be 
effective in enhancing response rates (Church, 1993; Dillman, 2000; Porter & Whitcomb, 2003).  
Administration of the full survey was initiated in mid-spring semester, 2012.  The Online sample 
procedures did not include the pre-notification since all contacts were by email from Survey 
Monkey, and no cash incentive was offered.  Anonymity in this study was assured by having 
survey data stored separately from email addresses in Survey Monkey, and by encouraging 
participants to avoid providing any identifying information on survey materials.  Response rates 
ranged from 28% in the Postal Mail only pilot study, 20% from the Online only sample, and 35% 
from the Mixed sample.  The analyses and results described in this paper are based on the full 
phase combined sample of 581 respondents from 40 institutions.  
Instrument and Measures 
The survey instrument presented nine scenarios depicting various types of research misconduct 
and/or questionable research practice, each followed by questions eliciting the respondent 
perceptions regarding certain moral and rational choice issues.  The scenarios were adapted from 
the social science version of the Ethical Decision-Making Measures (EDM’s) created by 
Mumford, et.al. (2006).  Several strategies were used to establish the validity and reliability of 
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the EDMs (Mumford, et al., 2006).   All adapted scenarios depict an untenured assistant 
professor conducting research and looking forward to (and under the pressure of) publishing the 
results and obtaining tenure.  Three of the scenarios were selected because they fit the regulatory 
definition of misconduct (FFP) and the remaining six were categorized as QRP’s, with the 
assistance of field experts.  The text of the scenarios is available in the appendix. 
Tibbetts and other authors have recommended the scenario approach for research involving 
rational choice theory (Tibbetts & Gibson, 2002), which typically entails presenting respondents 
with hypothetical scenarios as a method of assessing an individual’s likelihood of acting in a 
certain way.  Researchers have used it in studies exploring rational choice theory in cheating, 
crime, and other moral decision-making studies (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Ogilvie & Stewart, 
2010; Piquero, Exum, & Simpson, 2005; Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2005; Rebellon, et 
al., 2010; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Seipel & Eifler, 2010; Sierra & Hyman, 2008; Simpson, et 
al., 1998; Tibbetts, 1999).  A clear limitation to the use of scenarios is that intentions to engage 
in a particular behavior are not synonomous with actual behavior (Weber & Gillespie, 1998) and 
may not elicit emotions to the degree that may be necessary for certain kinds of research (Collett 
& Childs, 2011).  However, research has shown that perceived intentions and behavior are 
associated with one another (Beck & Ajzen, 1991), and using this approach was intended to 
lessen the risk of response bias, particularly as compared to self-reports of actual research 
misconduct. D
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Data Analysis 
Beyond descriptive analyses, the data analysis included t tests and tests of proportions for 
assessing group differences, as well as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for each of the 
nine scenarios separately, using selected variables and interaction terms.  Responses from an 
individual for a given scenario were only included in the regression analyses if the individual 
answered all items for that scenario. The dependent variable in all regression models was 
Probability of Misconduct, the respondent’s estimate of the likelihood s/he would take the same 
action as that depicted in each scenario.  
RESULTS 
Respondent Characteristics 
Most respondents were White (90%), and split roughly in half by gender (47.5% female) and by 
discipline (51.7% Psychology, 46.8% Sociology, 1.6% Other).  In addition, more than 90% were 
tenured or tenure track faculty; about 22% of the respondents were assistant professors, 23% 
were associate professors, and 46% were full professors.  Additionally, all but 3% of the sample 
received their graduate training in the U.S.  Forty-nine percent reported having observed what 
they would consider to be research misconduct in the past, and another 12.6% were not sure on 
that question.  About 79% reportedly spend between 26% and 75% of their time conducting 
research; overall, the mean percent effort engaging in research was 55%.  
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Probability of Misconduct 
In the first question under each scenario, respondents estimated the likelihood that they would 
take the same action as the hypothetical researcher did, referred to below as Probability of 
Misconduct.  This item was addressing the moral intent component of the Rest four-component 
model of ethical decision-making (Rest, 1984).  It was estimated by the respondent as a 
probability between 0 and 100%, and served as the dependent variable in subsequent analyses.  
The results are shown in Table 1 for each of the two sub-samples involved in the study, faculty 
from psychology and from sociology departments, with the three FFP scenarios listed first. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 The perceived Probability of Misconduct was highest on average for the scenario Authorship to 
Gain Favor for both disciplinary samples.  Psychologists reported on average that there was a 
41% likelihood they would do the same as the researcher in the scenario did under the same 
circumstances, and sociologists reported an average 37.3% likelihood.  The least likely scenario 
for both groups was Fabricated Data, with psychologists reporting 1.7% likelihood of taking the 
action depicted and the sociologists 5.4%.  Overall, the average response for the psychologists 
was about 4-6 percentage points lower than for the sociologists for several of the scenarios, 
including all three of the FFP scenarios.  As shown, t test results demonstrate that some of these 
differences are statistically significant.  Standard deviations on some of the scenarios were fairly 
high, however (not shown).  The standard deviation for perceived Probability of Misconduct in 
the Authorship to Gain Favor scenario, for example, was about .30 for both groups. 
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Moral Assessment 
The second item in the assessment of the scenarios involved respondents rating on a 5-point 
Likert scale the extent to which they perceived a moral dimension in the scenario.  Ratings 
ranged from 1 (Moral Dimension not present at all) to 5 (Moral Dimension clearly present).  
This item was addressing Rest’s moral sensitivity component.  Unless the respondent chose “not 
applicable” for item 2, item 3 then invited a judgment in regard to how morally wrong the action 
depicted is, using a Likert scale of 1 (not at all wrong) to 5 (very wrong).  This item was 
addressing Rest’s moral judgment component.  Results for both items are shown in Table 2 for 
the percentage of respondents that selected a 4 or 5 on the scale.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The three scenarios rated most often by respondents overall as having a moral dimension were 
the three FFP scenarios for each group, followed closely by Conflict of Interest and Reneges on 
Authorship.  Only 40.1% of overall participants perceived the scenario Authorship to Gain Favor 
as having a moral dimension.  Ratings for Moral Judgment appear to parallel the Moral 
Dimension ratings, with the actions taken in the three FFP situations most often seen as wrong or 
very wrong, followed again by Reneges on Authorship and Conflict of Interest.  Generally, the 
results for Moral Dimension and Moral Judgment trend in the same direction as those for 
Probability of Misconduct, suggesting perhaps that those who see a moral dimension in these 
scenarios may be more likely to view the action taken as wrong, and less likely to believe they 
would do it under the same circumstances.   Also included in Table 2 are the breakdowns by 
discipline.  The tests of proportions between the percentages on these items for each discipline 
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were statistically significant for only one scenario.  Just under 9% fewer psychologists than 
sociologists reported seeing a moral dimension in and judging Reneges on Authorship as wrong.  
The responses given on these two items were highly correlated with one another.  The 
correlations for the nine scenarios ranged from 69% to 88%, all statistically significant at p<.001.  
A likely explanation for this is that these two items on the instrument may actually be measuring 
the same thing.  It is possible that respondents did not fully perceive what was meant in regard to 
whether or not there was a moral dimension present in the scenario as distinct from judging the 
action itself as more or less wrong.  Because these items appear to be measuring the same 
construct, only Moral Judgment was included in the regression models. 
Rational Choice Assessment 
Finally, questions 4 and 5 after each scenario invited respondents to assess the likelihood that the 
action would be “caught” or found out, discussed below as the Detection variables, and the 
likelihood of consequences if the action was in fact found out, referred to below as Internal 
Sanctions and External Sanctions.  The probabilities for each of the detection and sanction items 
were recorded on a scale of 0-100% by the respondent. 
Likelihood of detection.  The average estimated likelihood of detection is shown in Table 3 for 
the following:  (a) by a colleague in the department, (b) by a publisher when the article is 
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submitted for peer review1; and (c) by a university administrator or research oversight 
committee.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Respondents on average estimated a probability of under 50% that a colleague would detect one 
of the FFP situations, and the estimated probabilities are even lower for publishers and 
administrators/review committees.  Detection by a colleague in the department was seen as most 
likely on average by respondents, with the highest mean likelihood of detection being for the 
scenario Reneges on Authorship at 69.1%.  The two lowest estimates of detection by publishers 
were in the scenarios involving Authorship to Gain Favor and Reneges on Authorship.    
Likelihood of sanctions.  Similar results are shown in Table 4 in regard to the seven sanction 
items included in the rational choice assessment, with the first two columns showing the results 
for what might be seen as “internal” sanctions-those more or less imposed on oneself (a and b), 
and the remainder as “external” sanctions-those that would be determined and applied by others 
(c-g).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
As shown, the highest estimated likelihood for the Internal Sanctions of Shame and 
Embarrassment, on average, was associated with the three FFP scenarios.  The others were still 
fairly high as well, with a better than even chance that respondents would feel both shame and 
embarrassment in all but one of the scenarios, which is again Authorship to Gain Favor.  The 
                                                 
1 In Conflict of Interest, this Detection item was changed to “the funder when the grant is submitted for review” 
because the scenario involved reporting a potential conflict of interest in a grant application. 
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latter is the scenario that respondents estimated had a 58% chance of being detected by 
colleagues, but less than a quarter of them felt it was wrong (17% of psychologists and 22% of 
sociologists).  
In regard to the External Sanctions, again the three FFP scenarios had the highest likelihood 
across the scenarios, with one major exception.  Respondents on average anticipated a mean 59% 
likelihood of being censured by a research review committee if they were caught engaging in 
IRB noncompliance and a mean 35% likelihood of being sanctioned from engaging in research 
for a period of time.  They reported on average that there was almost a 9% chance one might be 
dismissed from the university in that scenario. 
  Composite variables.  Three composite variables were created: (a) a composite Detection 
score, which is an average of all three detection items for each respondent; (b) a composite of 
Shame and Embarrassment, as the two Internal Sanctions; and (c) a composite of the External 
Sanctions, which included all of the remaining sanction items, Censure in File, Censure by 
Committee, Sanctioned from Engaging in Research; and Dismissal, except for Criminal Arrest 
and Prosecution, for which the probabilities were extremely low..  The Detection composite 
seemed to be a little less reliable than the other two, but all have acceptable reliability in the 
various scenarios (ranging from .61 to .95). 
Regression Analysis 
The results of a regression analysis for each of the nine scenarios are shown in Table 5.  Results 
for the FFP scenarios are shown in the first three columns, followed by those for the QRP 
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scenarios.  As can be seen, all of the coefficients for Moral Judgment are highly significant (p< 
.001), suggesting that moral judgment may be a consistent predictor for research misconduct.  In 
the scenario describing an unreported Conflict of Interest, for example, every step increase in the 
five-point Likert scale toward a judgment of wrongness led to a decrease in the estimated 
likelihood of this type of misconduct by 14.92 points.  Results for the IRB Noncompliance 
scenario were among the lower statistically significant effects, where each step increase toward a 
judgment of wrongness reduced the estimated likelihood of misconduct by about 7.03 points. 
As shown, the Detection composite did not predict the perceived likelihood of misconduct in 
most scenarios, although the effect was significant for Reneges on Authorship.  Nor typically did 
the External Sanction composite, although three of these coefficients were also significant.  
However, the composite variable of Internal Sanctions (the Shame and Embarrassment 
composite) was a very consistent predictor of the perceived likelihood of misconduct.  In all of 
the scenarios except Conflict of Interest, a statistically significant effect can be seen on estimated 
likelihood of misconduct from potential feelings of shame and embarrassment regarding the 
action described.  
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
Looking at the characteristics of the sample, one can see that the differences previously shown 
between sociologists and psychologists appear to be borne out in the regression.  In seven of the 
scenarios, sociologists reported being approximately 3-6 points more likely to engage in the 
misconduct depicted than the psychologists.  The exceptions were Adjusted Reporting and 
Authorship to Gain Favor, where any apparent differences were not statistically significant. 
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In regard to academic position, there were three scenarios in which full professors estimated they 
would be less likely to engage in the hypothetical misconduct than the referent group of assistant 
professors:  False Reporting, Reneges on Authorship, and Authorship to Gain Favor.  Perceived 
likelihood of misconduct was only different between males and females in one scenario, IRB 
noncompliance.  In that scenario, male respondents were about 4.1 percentage points more likely 
than females on average to hypothetically not report the sample change to the IRB, under those 
circumstances.  Any apparent differences in the other scenarios were not statistically significant.  
In a few of the scenarios, one can see large effect sizes related to Race, especially Asians 
compared to Whites, and Other compared to Whites.  However, there were only two Others in 
the sample, and seven Asian/Pacific Islanders, and so the results may be artifacts of the low 
sample sizes.  Finally, the results pertaining to percent time spent in research were significant in 
only one of the scenarios, Fabricated Data, where every percent increase in the time engaged in 
research led to an increase in the perceived likelihood of this type of misconduct by .08%.     
 An interaction term, Moral Judgment x External Sanctions, was also added to the model, 
to examine the hypothesis that rational choice calculations are less important when a situation or 
potential action is perceived as morally wrong.  The interaction term was statistically significant 
in three of the scenarios (the same three as for External Sanctions alone), Fabricated Data, False 
Reporting, and IRB Noncompliance.  An examination of the plots for these scenarios 
demonstrated that the marginal effect of External Sanctions on Probability of Misconduct was 
the highest when Moral Judgment was not at all wrong and steadily increased to no effect at all 
when Moral Judgment was very wrong.  In Fabricated Data, for example, as shown in Figure 
1,the marginal effect ranged from -.04 (not at all wrong) to 0 (very wrong).  This supports the 
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hypothesis that the potential for External Sanctions may be more of a factor in situations where 
the individual perceives the action to be taken as morally acceptable to some degree.  
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the phenomenon of academic research 
misconduct from the perspective of rational choice theory and the Rest, et al., model of moral 
decision-making.  Drawing on a national sample of university sociologists and psychologists, 
respondent assessments of nine research scenarios were used to examine the likelihood that 
faculty would engage in these hypothetical misbehaviors and to what extent their perceptions in 
that regard would be predicted by moral awareness, moral judgments, and expectations of 
detection and consequences.  Analysis of the data showed that field and position were a factor in 
perceived likelihood of research misconduct in some cases.  Field was a consistently small 
predictor of the perceived likelihood of misconduct, with the sociologists scoring slightly higher 
than the psychologists in virtually all of the scenarios.  In regard to position, the results showed 
that the perceived likelihood of misconduct was lower for full professors than assistant 
professors on the authorship-related scenarios, which is consistent with how academia is 
structured.  Senior faculty are under less pressure to get publications out, and first author 
publications particularly, and they are much less likely to need to please others who might seek a 
“courtesy” listing as an author on a publication.    
Overall, the perceived likelihood of the most serious misbehaviors (Fabrication, Falsification, 
and Plagiarism) generally was low, and the perceived likelihood of faculty engaging in 
Questionable Research Practices was quite variable, consistent with prior research in this area.  
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Moral judgment was shown to be a consistently strong predictor of the perceived likelihood of 
misconduct across multiple scenarios.  Anticipated internal sanctions such as shame and 
embarrassment were also shown to be a highly consistent factor in the perceived likelihood of 
misconduct, but perceptions of the likelihood of detection and external sanctions only had direct 
independent effects in certain scenarios.  
It is noteworthy that the two lowest average estimates of Detection for publishers were in the 
scenarios involving Authorship to Gain Favor and Reneges on Authorship.  Researchers may 
perceive a higher likelihood of detection of such authorship issues by publishers in the future as 
journals begin to require documentation from all authors on their specific contributions to 
manuscripts prior to publication.  An alternative consideration is that respondents who rate this 
scenario as not involving a moral dimension may also expect that there would be no concern for 
publishers to detect.  A key finding in regard to Detection is that respondents on average 
estimated a probability of under 50% that a colleague would detect one of the FFP situations, and 
the estimated probabilities were even lower for publishers and administrators/review committees.  
In fact, the perceived probabilities were much lower overall for publishers and administrators to 
detect misconduct, likely due to the proximity of colleagues.  The notable exceptions to this are 
Conflict of Interest, which respondents estimated would be detected by publishers on average 
about 35% of the time and IRB noncompliance, which respondents estimated at an average 
likelihood of 31.1% for administrators, still fairly low, but higher than any other type of situation 
for publishers or administrators.  In fact, respondents occasionally commented in the survey 
instrument on the administrator/ committee item, expressing a lack of understanding as to what 
administrator or research review committee was being referred to in that question.  This would 
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suggest there are few formal administrative or peer research oversight activities in the 
universities for faculty from psychology and sociology departments, other than the IRB.  
Another notable result was the decreasing perceived probabilities of sanctions overall as the 
sanctions become more severe.  In fact, there seemed to be very low perceived probabilities in 
general of being dismissed from the university or arrest and prosecution for any type of research 
misconduct.  Dismissal was estimated at low probabilities on average even for the FFP 
situations, although dismissal for fabricating data was estimated at a 28.5% mean likelihood, the 
highest result.  
And finally, it is important to note a very clear pattern with the estimated probabilities for Shame 
and Embarrassment in comparison to the External Sanctions.  The former estimates tended to run 
much higher for all scenarios than the latter did, suggesting that internal consequences may in 
fact be much more important in a peer-reviewed research environment than the latter.  In keeping 
with one of the study’s key hypotheses, the effects of the rational choice variables were 
conditioned in some scenarios on moral judgments, whereby the likelihood of misconduct was 
better predicted by the likelihood of external sanctions when individuals perceived the action as 
not morally wrong.  
The results of this study are largely consistent with previous estimates of the prevalence of 
research misconduct among faculty (Fanelli, 2009).  The likelihood of fabrication and 
falsification, in particular, were estimated as rare occurrences, while some of the less significant 
misbehaviors were perceived to be fairly likely.  Surprisingly, external sanctions in general were 
not as important as an independent factor as shown in other research but the interaction effect 
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between moral judgments and potential sanctions was consistent to some extent with what others 
have found for corporate crime and academic cheating (Tibbetts, 1997, 1999; Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1996). 
Caution must be exercised in interpreting the results due to several factors.  This study measured 
participant perceptions of the likelihood of misconduct, not actual behavior. The possibility of 
respondent bias is also present, since this is a sensitive topic, and participants may not be 
responding with complete honesty, either out of concern for what others might think should they 
somehow become aware of their responses or simply out of a desire to see themselves as moral 
persons.  Finally, the lack of precision in some of the measures may have led to variability in 
how participants responded that would not otherwise have been present.  It is possible that 
respondents did not adequately distinguish between what was meant by a moral dimension being 
present and a moral judgment that an action was wrong.  Similarly, the shame and 
embarrassment items were very crude, and very likely conflated perceptions of the various moral 
emotions, especially shame, embarrassment, guilt, remorse, or regret.  
Even so, the findings from this study have some very interesting implications.  For example, 
education and training efforts on campus that primarily work toward raising awareness of the 
rules and the consequences for breaking them might be better off shifting to an exploration of the 
moral issues involved in conducting research.  Given the difficulty in monitoring the myriad 
details involved in research activities, enforcement of such rules and consequences is challenging 
at best, and thus remain reliant on individual researchers to make good decisions as they proceed 
through their daily work lives.  Scientific norms of disinterestedness and organized skepticism 
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(Merton, 1942) were grounded in this understanding, but now are being seriously challenged by 
the pressures to obtain funding and publish interesting results (Anderson, Ronning, De Vries, & 
Martinson, 2010).  Rather than devising new and elaborate methods for detecting misconduct, 
perhaps focusing on peer support and researchers’ passion for doing good science would be more 
effective in reducing the likelihood of questionable research practices - those types of 
misconduct that are most prevalent, most difficult to consistently monitor, and most amenable, 
arguably, to correction.  Notwithstanding the current state of higher education and government, 
the financial challenges and shifting emphasis to business models, accountability, and 
consumerism, perhaps the most significant enhancement that would improve integrity in research 
is time–time for faculty to think about their research, reflect on the adequacy and appropriateness 
of their methods, and communicate with colleagues and mentors about the process as it unfolds. 
On the other hand, one area that perhaps does benefit from more of an instrumental approach are 
those practices that maybe seen as more morally ambiguous, such as those types of IRB 
noncompliance that are unrelated to study-specific human subjects protections.  It was interesting 
to note how many of the respondents found the IRB scenario to be morally wrong, given the low 
probability of actual harm to study participants in that scenario (using a consent form approved 
for one youth sample for another, slightly older one, without informing the IRB).  One can 
speculate how the respondents’ perceptions of this scenario might have been affected by the now 
ubiquitous presence of IRBs on campus, and the role that they play in promoting an overall 
system of research integrity, such that any violations of IRB requirements may seem morally 
wrong.  Regardless, this study would suggest that most researchers who are aware of the moral 
implications of their interactions with study participants may be likely to do the right thing on 
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their own without concern for sanctions.  But for those who do not perceive every IRB 
requirement as a moral imperative, the results suggest that an expectation of detection and 
sanctions might then play a role in preventing rule-breaking.  In this sense, post-approval 
monitoring systems, or other mechanisms for increasing the perception of detection and 
sanctions for misbehavior, can be useful in maintaining an efficient system of rule-following as 
well as catching the bad apples that may cause real harm to participants. 
Additional research must be undertaken to fully understand the interaction between moral and 
rational factors in decision-making.  Future studies should broaden the sample to include other 
fields and better measure emotional states and possibly other “internal” sanctions.  In addition, 
analyses are needed that can aggregate the data across scenarios, to better answer questions 
comparing FFP versus QRP misconduct.  Finally, a valuable adjustment to this study design 
would be to integrate environmental variables that have shown promise in previous studies, 
including perceptions of distributive justice, observation of misconduct in the past, and 
mentoring and peer support.  
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Appendix 
Scenarios/Vignettes from the Research Instrument 
SCENARIO 1.  Dr. Cedar, a young developmental psychologist, obtained an R01 Research 
Grant from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development to study aggression 
in elementary school children. Cedar suspects that some children with a certain genetic makeup 
will be especially susceptible to the effects of television violence.  Part of the project requires 
obtaining a cheek swab for DNA analysis, but interviewing and observing children in the 
classroom constitutes the major effort.  Cedar is anxious to get results from this study published 
as soon as possible to support an upcoming tenure review.    
ITEM 1A.  After collecting data for one semester, Dr. Cedar becomes concerned that the 
preliminary results from the study are not promising and decides to expand the sample 
population to include adolescents.  Cedar feels frustrated, however, that the study may require 
additional IRB review due to the change in sample, and therefore decides to proceed using the 
consent documents already approved for the younger children without bringing the sample 
change to the attention of the IRB.  
ITEM 1B.  In the spring, Dr. Cedar begins analysis of the results from the adolescent sample 
and finds that the pattern largely supports the expected findings.  During the analysis, however, 
Cedar spots an anomaly in the data and after talking to the research assistants, believes an error 
occurred in the way the results were recorded during the third observation for each participant.  
It is not possible to repeat the observations as the third in the sequence and in any case 
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additional observations for the entire sample would take too much time.  Throwing those 
observations out, however, renders all of the results non-significant.  Cedar decides to create 
scores for the third observations, using his best guess as to what they would have been had they 
been carried out correctly, and then use those data in the analysis.  The results are now largely 
significant and Cedar proceeds to draft the initial article. 
ITEM 1C.  Cedar’s graduate students are currently writing manuscripts for projects they 
completed as extensions of the primary study. Cedar has already implied that the graduate 
students will be first authors on their respective projects, but reconsiders, given the pressure for 
additional first-author publications for the upcoming review.  Cedar decides to remain as first 
author and list the graduate students as second and subsequent authors. 
SCENARIO 2.  Dr. Daniels has earned substantial prestige as a young researcher in the field of 
behavioral economics. Daniels’ program of research is focused on the future discounting of 
delayed benefits.  Currently Daniels is studying the effects of self-payment for end-of-semester 
grades in high school students. Students are to be given 0, 15, or 30 dollars to use now in any 
way they like, or to deposit in a “lock box” to be redeemed only after receiving a “B” or better in 
their required geometry course.  Daniels is hoping to be ready for tenure review next year.  
ITEM 2A.  Along with a consent form, Daniels has sent a brief description of the study home 
with students.  When the forms are returned, although signed, a few contain notes from the 
parents saying that they agree only if their child is included in one of the monetary groups, but 
not if their child is in the no-payment group.  Even more of the students’ assent agreements carry 
this stipulation.  Daniels needs all the subjects possible, and so decides to satisfy as many 
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requests as possible, and try to make up the difference at the next school, where hopefully the 
problem can be lessened. 
ITEM 2B.  Daniels has nearly finished the study and an initial report of the hypotheses and 
results is being prepared for the funder.  Daniels’ graduate student, Lauren, has been assigned 
the job of developing the first draft of the results section.  Daniels instructs Lauren to gloss over 
the striking SES and ethnicity results that were found, because they might be interpreted as greed 
and impulsivity.  Lauren, on the other hand, maintains that a full account of the key findings 
should be given.  Daniels explains to Lauren that the main experimental question was about 
incentive effects, and that is all she should describe, leaving out the interactions with class and 
money. 
ITEM 2C.  Daniels has been hard at work writing up the high school lock-box data, and it 
occurs to him that the results are more than strong enough to merit a neuro-economic analysis of 
the effect.  It could show how his manipulation might reshape a student’s fMRI index of future 
academic performance and, by implication, the change in his or her subjective economic value.  
A second phase of the study was therefore initiated, in which serial fMRIs scans were taken 
while new student participants were asked to make their lock-box decisions. Daniels watched as 
the first round of images appeared, and nothing looked especially promising. Brain metabolic 
activity seemed more or less uniformly distributed across all conditions.  Daniels’ post-doc 
noted, however, that new digital technology would allow them to adjust the images a bit to 
ensure the results appeared more interesting.  Daniels is concerned the funding support for his 
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research will dry up if he does not continue to produce results, and so agrees provided the 
adjustments are minor and cannot easily be detected.  
 
 
SCENARIO 3.  Dr. Channing is a young American anthropologist studying agricultural 
practices of the Mofu people of Cameroon, Africa.  Due to the demanding nature of this project, 
which requires frequent travel to Cameroon and lengthy periods of data collection, Channing has 
not published any of the findings yet, although one paper is under review. The delay has been 
unavoidable, but tenure review is only a year away, so the pressure to publish from this project is 
building. 
ITEM 3A.  Channing has hurried to prepare a manuscript for publication.  A collaborator 
phones to say that a senior department member, Dr. Foster, has been hinting that he should be 
listed as a co-author. The collaborator points out a few advantages of including him. Although 
Foster did not directly contribute to the study design, he did provide useful advice regarding 
data analysis.  Channing sees that including him as an author might increase the paper’s 
prestige, and thus decides to go ahead and include Foster last in the list of authors; it costs 
nothing, and can only add prestige and promote good relations with Foster—something needed 
for the upcoming tenure review.  
ITEM 3B.  The paper is accepted pending minor revisions and Wilson, one of Channing’s 
graduate students, reanalyzes data from the Mofu project for his Master’s thesis. The student 
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finds that in Channing’s haste to get the data analyzed, some of the agricultural plots were 
omitted. When included, the important differences are reduced to marginal significance. The 
pressure to get the paper out is now overwhelming, and so Channing decides to keep the results 
section as is, but emphasize in a revision that the readers should be cautious about 
interpretations because more work on this topic is needed. 
ITEM 3C.  Channing is collaborating with a senior researcher on a grant proposal to the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). She notices that a consulting 
agreement with an agricultural manufacturer is not disclosed in his draft of the application. She 
guesses that disclosing this fact might compromise approval by IFAD and supposes that the 
principal investigator (PI), who knows the ins and outs of the application process, may have 
purposefully omitted the information. Channing is hesitant to question her collaborator about 
this potentially sensitive subject, and finally decides to proofread and modify technical details of 
the proposal as needed, but respect the PI’s decision about listing his ties to industry.  
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FIGURE 1 Conditional effects of external sanctions on perceived likelihood of misconduct in the 
Fabrication of Data scenario.   
Regression Model  (with interaction term Moral Judgment x External Sanctions) is plotted for 
the scenario Fabrication of Data, including the confidence interval for statistical significance. 
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Dependent Variable: Misconduct
 
Marginal Effect of X (External Sanctions) on Y (Misconduct) As Z (Judgment) Changes
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TABLE 1 
 Probability of Misconduct by Discipline 
 
  All Respondents   Psychology   Sociology          
Scenario M n Min Max  M n Min Max  M n Min Max   diff. t   
Fabricated Data 3.5 468 0 100  1.7 235 0 100  5.4 199 0 100  -3.7 -3.01 ** 
Adjusted Images 6.2 434 0 100  5.3 222 0 80  7.2 191 0 100  -1.9 -1.18 
False Reporting 9.4 482 0 100  7.7 243 0 75  11.8 207 0 100  -4.1 -2.56 * 
IRB Noncompliance 8.7 476 0 100  7.2 227 0 100  11.3 207 0 100  -4.1 -2.08 * 
Reneges on Authorship 9.4 474 0 100  9.5 242 0 80  9.6 204 0 100  -0.2 -0.11 
Parents Dictate Study Groups 11.0 421 0 100  8.2 207 0 100  14.8 185 0 100  -6.6 -2.98 ** 
Adjusted Reporting 14.0 455 0 100  14.4 234 0 95  13.1 196 0 100  1.3 0.58  
Authorship to Gain Favor 39.1 451 0 100  41.0 221 0 100  37.3 200 0 100  3.7 1.26  
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Conflict of Interest 17.5 466 0 100   15.2 237 0 90   20.6 205 0 100    -5.4 -2.31 * 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.                   
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TABLE 2 
Disciplinary Differences in Moral Dimension and Moral Judgment 
  Moral Dimension     Moral Judgment   
 
Respondents Choosing 4 or 5 (Clearly 
Present)    
Respondents Choosing 4 or 5 (Wrong 
or Very Wrong)   
 All   Psychology Sociology     All   Psychology  Sociology       
Scenario % n   % n   % n   diff z     % n   % n   % n   diff z   
Fabricated Data 95.3 446  96.6 227   93.5 186  3.1 1.5   93.8 439 95.3 224  92.5 184  2.8 1.2  
Adjusted Images 88.0 382 86.9 193  89.0 170  -2.1 -0.6  87.9 381 86.9 193  88.5 169  -1.6 -0.5 
False Reporting 88.8 428 90.5 220  88.4 183  2.1 0.7   85.3 411 87.6 213  83.1 172  4.5 1.4  
IRB Noncompliance 64.9 309 61.7 140  66.7 138  -5.0 -1.1  64.1 305 62.6 142  66.2 137  -3.6 -0.8 
Reneges on Authorship 82.7 392 78.5 190  87.3 178  -8.8 -2.4 * 78.3 371 74.4 160  83.3 170  -8.9 -2.3 * 
Parents Dictate Study Groups 60.3 254 59.9 124  60.5 112  -0.6 -0.1  62.2 262 62.8 130  59.5 110  3.3 0.7  
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Adjusted Reporting 59.8 272 58.1 136  60.7 119  -2.6 -0.5  54.5 248 53.4 125  54.6 107  -1.2 -0.2 
Authorship to Gain Favor 40.1 181 36.7 81  43.0 86  -6.3 -1.3  20.2 91  16.7 37  22.0 44  -5.3 -1.4 
Conflict of Interest 85.0 396  86.5 205   82.9 170   3.6 1.0     77.7 362  78.9 187   75.1 154   3.8 0.9   
*p<.05. 
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TABLE 3 
Perceived Likelihood of Detection of Misconduct 
  Colleague   Publisher   Administrator     
Scenario M S.D.   M S.D.   M S.D.   n 
Fabricated Data 31.9 30.3  18.3 24.5  15.7 23.2  468 
Adjusted Images 39.0 30.3  23.6 27.0  15.6 22.3  434 
False Reporting 46.4 32.2  18.8 23.4  13.1 19.9  482 
IRB Noncompliance 35.9 31.7  15.4 23.5  31.1 30.3  476 
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Reneges on Authorship 69.1 28.8  12.8 19.6  14.9 21.7  474 
Parents Dictate Study Groups 28.2 30.8  21.5 31.1  13.7 22.6  421 
Adjusted Reporting 43.5 32.4  27.4 29.8  14.0 22.2  455 
Authorship to Gain Favor 57.5 33.5  15.0 25.7  12.3 22.6  451 
Conflict of Interest 31.1 31.1   35.0 29.4   22.6 25.5   466 
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TABLE 4 
Perceived Likelihood of Sanctions for Misconduct 
  Shame   Embarrassment  
Censure 
in file   
Censure 
by 
committee  
Sanctioned 
from 
research   Dismissal  
Criminal 
arrest     
Scenario M S.D.  M S.D.   M S.D.  M S.D.   M S.D.   M S.D.   M S.D.   n 
Fabricated Data 91.0 22.4 89.7 23.0  62.9 36.6 62.9 37.4  45.8 37.8  28.4 32.1  5.2 14.1  468 
Adjusted Images 84.5 27.3 81.6 29.6  41.6 36.1 43.5 37.1  28.2 33.1  15.3 24.3  2.6 9.6  434 
False Reporting 83.7 26.9 78.9 30.0  33.0 33.1 30.0 32.2  15.7 25.9  8.8 17.6  1.4 6.8  482 
IRB Noncompliance 70.5 35.0 67.3 34.8  41.3 35.6 58.6 35.6  34.6 33.4  8.8 17.5  2.1 6.9  476 
Reneges on Authorship 75.7 30.0 68.1 33.6  14.5 22.4 11.1 20.3  3.8 13.0  1.5 6.2  0.3 1.7  474 
Parents Dictate Study Groups 70.0 35.7 67.0 36.4  25.4 31.2 30.0 33.9  15.2 24.9  5.8 15.2  0.8 4.5  421 
Adjusted Reporting 58.1 38.1 55.3 38.2  14.2 24.5 14.4 25.3  6.7 17.8  2.7 9.7  0.4 3.3  455 
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Authorship to Gain Favor 29.3 32.0 26.6 31.3  4.6 12.4 4.5 12.5  1.4 6.2  0.7 4.2  0.1 0.4  451 
Conflict of Interest 63.2 33.9  55.7 35.9   22.1 29.4  25.7 31.2   11.9 22.6   5.4 14.2   1.8 8.2   466 
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TABLE 5 
Estimates of Perceived Probability of Misconduct 
  FFP Scenarios   QRP Scenarios 
Variable 
Fabricat
ed Data 
Adjuste
d 
Images 
False 
Reporti
ng  
IRB 
Non-
complia
nce 
Reneges 
on 
Authors
hip 
Parents 
Dictate 
Study 
Groups 
Adjuste
d 
Reporti
ng 
Authors
hip to 
Gain 
Favor 
Conflic
t of 
Interest 
Constant 
43.3
2   
55.6
8   
60.4
1    
39.9
2   
46.7
1   
45.0
0   
43.0
8   79.95  
79.3
2   
Moral Judgment 
-
8.19 
**
* 
-
10.8
8 
**
* 
-
8.73 
**
*  -7.03 
**
* -7.00 
**
* 
-
5.78 
**
* 
-
7.66 
**
* 
-
11.86 
**
* 
-
14.9
2 
**
* 
Detection 0.04  0.02  0.02  0.09  0.09 * 0.01  
-
0.02 0.07  
-
0.01  
Internal Sanctions 
-
0.09 * 
-
0.08 * 
-
0.16 
**
*  -0.14 
**
* -0.15 
**
* 
-
0.23 
**
* 
-
0.17 
**
* -0.15 * 
-
0.07  
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External Sanctions 
-
0.50 ** 
-
0.40  
-
0.64 *  -0.39 ** 0.68  
-
0.24  
-
0.22 1.18  
-
0.43  
Moral Judgment x 
External Sanctions 0.10 ** 0.09  0.13 *  0.09 * -0.14 0.07  0.09 -0.23  0.10  
Sociology 3.10 * 3.09 * 3.37 *  5.21 ** 3.65 * 5.98 ** 
-
0.08 -2.63  6.00 ** 
Associate Professor 
-
0.49  0.41  
-
1.58  -6.37 * -3.27 
-
1.12  3.85 -4.91  1.29  
Full Professor 
-
0.75  
-
0.38  
-
4.86 **  -2.01 -4.25 * 0.28  
-
0.68 -8.87 ** 
-
1.28  
Administrator 2.86  2.13  
-
4.63  -2.42 -3.99 
-
1.06  7.62 
-
15.40 
-
1.48  
Non TT Faculty 
-
2.82  
-
3.49  
-
5.26  -3.56 -4.81 4.01  
-
4.47 -9.23  
-
2.54  
Other Position 
-
 
-
 
-
  7.73  -2.75 
-
 
-
 1.45  5.61  
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4.58 1.78 8.01 11.0
5 
3.31 
Male 1.19  1.78  
-
0.24  4.16 * 2.49  0.68  2.17 -1.30  0.89  
Black 3.73  1.83  6.58 *  -1.04 2.58  5.44  
-
1.21 3.78  
-
3.97  
Hispanic 
-
0.63  3.56  5.04  1.62  -2.31 
-
4.23  5.71 -2.00  1.42  
Asian  0.26  1.84  
15.5
8 **  9.22  8.68  1.74  9.87 -1.14  
17.7
3 * 
Other 2.18  
16.7
4  
10.8
2   3.89  6.04  
-
3.68  
-
3.10 16.65 
39.8
4 * 
% Time Spent in 
Research 0.08 ** 0.03  0.02  0.06  -0.02 
-
0.02  0.09 -0.02  0.02  
Adj. R2 0.22   0.39   0.39     0.21   0.32   0.34   0.36   0.30   0.39   
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*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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